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I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly everyone recognizes that delegating authority conserves scarce
institutional resources. Indeed, as the regulatory state has expanded and evolved over
the years in increasingly complex and subtle directions, virtually every governmental
entity now by necessity delegates at least some of its decision-making authority.1
Legal institutions are no different: we now stand witness to a correspondingly vast
and stratified system of decision-making hierarchies, populated by judicial or quasijudicial actors—particularly within lower-level courts and administrative
agencies—each of whom has been delegated the de jure or de facto authority to make
initial regulatory, legal, and/or policy decisions. 2 Moreover, within a broader
analytical framework, it is sometimes appropriate (with the exception of constitutional
jurisprudence) to conceive of the entire judicial branch of government as a delegated
decision-maker for legislative and executive entities.3
The benefits of delegation, however, come hard-earned. In spite of all its
economizing attraction, delegation (by definition) divorces at least some real authority
from a central, accountable actor, creating a fissure within which at least two types
of institutional conflict are bound to thrive. First, lower-level decision makers may
possess relatively limited resources to collect and process information that is relevant
to the ultimate policy choices at stake, thereby leading to an increased likelihood of
error. And second, classic incentive problems may emerge, as those who are
1

There is now ample evidence that both the regulatory state and the degree of
internal auditing within it has grown consistently throughout the twentieth century, even during
periods where de-regulatory parties dominated the presidency and/or Congress. See Richard H.
Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995). A
similar phenomenon appears manifest in Great Britain. See, e.g., Christopher Hood, Anthony J.
Travers, Colin Scott & George W. Jones, Bureaucratic Gamekeeping: Regulation of UK Public
Administration 1976 -1996 (Economic and Social Research Council study # L124251015, September
1997) (noting that since the mid-1970s, the number of auditing and inspecting bodies in the U.K.
has grown by nearly 20%, and the staff associated with those bodies has grown by around 60%).
2

In federal administrative agencies, the initial decisions are made by administrative
law judges. The percentage of ALJ decisions reviewed at higher levels within the agency varies
widely. See the data presented in S. BREYER, R. STEWART, C. SUNSTEIN & M. SPITZER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 792-4 (1998).
3

For instance, the United States Constitution explicitly authorizes Congress to
“make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution...all...Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.” U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8. This power
includes, inter alia, the ability to change law in a way that alters or nullifies the prospective
application of existing judicial opinions, and even retrospective application of such opinions to
appealable cases or those pending appeal. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 514 U.S. 211
(1995).
L:\SPITZER\auditfin.wpd; 10 November 1998
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entrusted with initial decision-making authority need not share the same aspirations
or interpretive ideologies as their superiors in the hierarchy.
While each of these potential problems has been studied in isolation, their
combination has garnered significantly less attention among legal scholars.4 Thus, our
chief goal of this essay is to tease out how error costs and agency costs interact with
one another within a judicial system, and in particular how they affect the nature and
magnitude of oversight exercised by upper-echelon actors (e.g., high courts) on their
lower-level counterparts (e.g., trial courts). Using a game-theoretic model of judicial
review, we illustrate how the dual concerns over (1) imprecision and (2) ideological
bias can affect the auditing strategies employed by such upper-echelon actors. Our
analysis of this model leads to a prediction that these strategies differ markedly,
depending on which concern tends to predominate. On the one hand, when lower
court imprecision is a central concern, a rational upper-echelon decision-maker will
tend to adopt an even-handed policy of intervention, in which the likelihood of review
and reversal depends relatively little on the precise content of the lower court’s
decision. Conversely, when concern over political bias predominates, a rational
upper-echelon decision-maker will tend to adopt a significantly more contingent
strategy, using the precise holding reached below to decide whether to review that
decision (or more subtly, to choose the intensity of review).
We will argue that the higher level court’s strategy described above helps
explain some of the traditional conflicts over judicial review. In addition, our analysis
provides a useful empirical prediction that bears significantly on the ongoing debate
surrounding purported “threats” to judicial independence.5 Further, our analysis
isolates a distinct benefit that flows from political differences between lower- and
upper-echelon decision-makers, particularly when both imprecision and political bias
coexist. Indeed, when an upper-level actor delegates authority to an ideological
“clone” that is nonetheless susceptible to error, the upper-level actor may have to
adopt a costly strategy of reviewing a relatively large number of holdings. In contrast,
when authority is delegated to a politically-distinct (but equally error-prone) lowerlevel actor, the upper-level actor can use her counterpart’s political differences as a
type of screening mechanism to assist her in deciding whether she should review a
particular decision. For example, were the Supreme Court decidedly more liberal than
a circuit court on a particular issue, then a decision by that conservative lower court
to uphold a relatively liberal statute (or alternatively, to strike down a relatively
conservative one) provides a sufficiently strong signal to the Supreme Court that it
need not review the instant opinion. Moreover, this economizing characteristic of

4

See, e.g., McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 3; Steven Shavell, The Appeals
Process As a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995).
5

See, e.g., ABA COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY (1997) [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
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political diversity within hierarchies holds true even when (and in fact especially
when) the lower court’s information about the “empirical” world is relatively noisy or
imprecise. This observation, in turn, suggests that there may be organizational
benefits associated with a judicial hierarchy in which lower-echelon actors are
“distinct” (as measured by their political leanings) from their upper-echelon principals.
The remainder of this paper consists of four parts. In Part II, we posit and
analyze a game-theoretic model of judicial decision-making within a two-tiered
hierarchy. There are a number of possible interpretations of such a hierarchy. For
example, it might (alternatively) represent the relationship between lower and higher
courts; administrative agencies and district courts; or a unitary (statute-interpreting)
judiciary and a unitary (statute-making) legislature.6 We then demonstrate that the
decision-making heuristics described above characterize equilibrium behavior within
the strategic framework of the model. We also show that an error-prone lowerechelon actor may, ironically, be audited relatively less frequently when its political
ideology is distinct from that of the upper echelon actor. In part III, we attempt to
apply these general arguments more specifically. We argue that our strategic account
of decision-making heuristics spawns intuitions that are helpful within a number of
legal settings, including administrative law, constitutional law, interpretive theories
of jurisprudence, and the tension between judicial independence and accountability.
Section IV presents concluding remarks, and Section V a technical appendix.
II. A MODEL OF JUDICIAL AUDITING
In this section we develop our principal arguments more formally, through an
institutional model of hierarchical judicial review. In particular, we characterize a
plausible equilibrium allocation of authority between a lower court and a higher court,
when the latter faces costs in reviewing lower court opinions. We are ultimately
interested in developing intuitions about the intensity with which higher-echelon
actors (such as appellate courts or legislatures) review the decisions of lower-echelon
actors (such as trial courts or administrative agencies), and its relationship to both
ideological differences and measurement error within the lower-echelon actors.
The analysis below fits squarely within the category of so-called “rational
actor” models within political science and economics; we assume that the relevant
law-creating actors (in this case, agencies, courts, and/or legislative bodies) have wellspecified preferences regarding outcomes, and that they act in a way that is
strategically calculated so as to satisfy these preferences, given their beliefs about the

6

Although it may seem peculiar at first to think of a legislative entity as a judicial
actor, within the strict statutory (as opposed to constitutional) context, legislatures are widely known
to act in a manner that is de facto tantamount to reviewing – and possibly overruling – perceived
errors in statute interpretation by traditional judicial actors. See note 1, supra.
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preferences and actions of other actors.7 Though such an approach is admittedly
stylized, its simplicity enables us to analyze the most intuitively compelling
characteristics about a problem, and to study their mutual interaction.
a. Framework and Fundamentals
i. Description of the Players and Regulatory Environment:
Consider a decision-making hierarchy consisting of two players. The first is
a “principal,” denoted by H (representing the “High Court,” or perhaps a court
reviewing an administrative agency, or possibly even a legislative body attempting to
legislate around a judicial opinion). The second player is an “agent,” denoted by L
(representing, respectively, the “Low Court,” or an administrative agency, or possibly
a unitary court system). These two players jointly interact in a strategic, hierarchical
choice mechanism (described at greater length below), the “outcome” of which
determines the content of a legal, public or regulatory policy.
We conceive of the ultimate outcome as some choice that can be represented
by a single point y that lies somewhere along the real number line. The precise
interpretation of y is left purposely general, but for the sake of discussion (and to
motivate a subsequent application of our model), suppose that y represents the degree
of contractual autonomy accorded to market participants over the selection of passive
restraints for passenger vehicles.8 Under this interpretation, “y = -4” would represent
“no autonomy” for buyers and sellers (or equivalently, extreme regulation and
requirements for passive restraint equipment), “y = 4” would represent “infinite
autonomy” (or no regulation whatsoever), and intermediate values would represent
proportionally intermediate degrees of autonomy.9

7

Similar approaches are employed by Charles Cameron et al. (Cite Columbia
working paper, 1996); David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight:
Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 227 (1995); and McNollGast,
Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 SO. CAL.
L. REV. 1631 (1995). Some have called the approach the “attitudinal model,” stressing its emphasis
on the dominant the role that political ideologies play relative to traditional legal formalism in
affecting outcomes. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Essay: Judicial Partisanship and
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J.
2155, 2157 (1997). Our approach is somewhat distinct, however, because it combines the attitudinal
approach with a complementary account of judicial review as a form of error correction.
8

See Part III(a), infra.

9

It might seem more natural to conceive of Y as the intensity of regulation, so that
y = -4 would represent “no regulation” and y = 4 would represent extreme regulation. We have
resisted this alternative conception, however, merely for descriptive ease. Given that the desire for
regulation is more frequently associated with the political Left, and that y = -4 corresponds to the
extreme left of the regulatory space Y, our ordering in fact provides a more natural analogy to the
L:\SPITZER\auditfin.wpd; 10 November 1998
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Players L and H must sequentially make a binary policy choice between two
options: the status quo ante state of the law and a “new” regulation. In particular,
suppose that y0 denotes the spatial location of “current law” as dictated by a status
quo, and y1 denotes the“new” law (such as an administrative policy, executive order,
statute, or electoral initiative). The locational values of the status quo ante and new
proposal are assumed to be common knowledge among the players. Moreover, we
shall suppress the mechanism by which these two choices are put on the agenda,
noting for now that this is a common constraint in legal decision-making.10 In order
to explore a particular numerical example, however, we will assume in the text that
follows that y0 = -1 and y1 = 1. In terms of the ongoing conceptual example, then, the
proposed shift from y0 to y1 represents a “de-regulatory” change, in the same spirit as
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s 1982 decision to rescind a
motor vehicle safety standard requiring automobiles to be equipped with “passive
restraints,” such as automatic seatbelts or airbags.11
The players, acting in sequence, adjudicate the proposed change from y0 to y1.
Player L is assumed to have no choice whether to review the new regulation (i.e., L
must hear out a challenge if made12). Once L has heard the case, she issues a holding
– denoted hereafter by yL – representing overturning or upholding the new law,
respectively. (Note that yL must equal either y0 or y1, since these are the only two
choices available to L) . Player H, on the other hand, is less constrained. After L
moves, H (having observed yL) is given the option to review L’s holding. The
strategies available to H at this point are binary, consisting of either a decision to
review L’s decision (or to “Grant” certification), or a decision to abstain from
reviewing (or to “Deny” certification).13 Note that H need not take a “symmetric”
approach to auditing: She might, for instance, decide to grant certification only if L
overturns y0, but not otherwise. In fact, the process of auditing is not a cheap one,
and may impose costs on H. For the purposes of our example, we shall suppose that

political spectrum.
10

The choice of appropriate value for y is itself an interesting stage that might
precede this model. One could imagine a legislature with its own preferences trying to come up with
a law that would pass muster in the court system. Certainly, the outcome of this game will provide
an indication as to which laws would survive relative to y0 . We hope to pursue this question in
greater detail in subsequent work.
11

See Section III(a), infra. The precise values of y0 and y1 are not critical from a
qualitative perspective.
12

It is possible to relax this assumption and generate similar results.

13

We recognize that for some H/L pairings (such as federal district courts and circuit
courts), H’s decision of whether to hear an appeal is not discretionary. However, even in these such
situations the intensity of review exercised by the appellate court may be subject to considerable
discretion. For just such an example, see Section III(a), infra.
L:\SPITZER\auditfin.wpd; 10 November 1998
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it can cost anywhere between $0 and $1 for H to audit L’s holding, and that the
precise realization of this cost distributed uniformly between $0 and $1.14
Nevertheless, should H decide to audit L, she will be permitted to hear the
case again, and then to issue her own holding—denoted hereafter by yH—that is
assumed to trump L’s. Equivalently, the final legal policy that emerges at the end of
the game is yH should H audit, and yL should H abstain.
ii. Judicial Preferences:
The judicial decision-makers within this model care about two things. First,
they are interested in effecting an ultimate legal outcome that is as consistent as
possible with their own policy preferences, given their ideology and any empirical
information about the world that is available. Second, the players wish to avoid the
administrative costs of reviewing others’ decisions.15 To this end, then, we shall
suppose that each of L and H attempt to minimize the expected sum of (1) the
expected squared distance16 between the final legal outcome yF and their respective
“ideal points”; and (2) any costs administrative costs they personally bear in reviewing
a decision from below.17
The term “ideal point” has a special connotation within our analysis. In
particular, we assume that each player’s most-preferred point in y-space depends on

14

More explicitly, H is assumed to know the realization of her reviewing cost at the
time she makes her own auditing decision, but all that L knows about H’s auditing cost when issuing
her initial decision is the uniform probability distribution of H’s cost.
The assumption that the costs to review lie between $0 and $1 a simplifying one. In the
appendix, we present a more general framework in which the cost of auditing (interpretable as an
opportunity cost) is given by c0 C / [0,4); c ~ g(c)>0, with associated distribution function G(c).
In addition, it is possible for the lower court to face an “embarrassment” cost of having been
reversed. It is possible to add this cost to the model, but it detracts from our ultimate intuitions, and
is therefore suppressed here.
15

In order to conduct any analysis of judicial behavior within the sequential
framework described above, one must first specify how judges evaluate various legal outcomes.
Within a game-theoretic framework, it is thus important to make some assumption about what the
actors in this model attempt to “maximize” in making their decisions. To be sure, this question is
the subject of significant current debate; but that debate is largely beyond our ken for current
purposes. For an even more comprehensive list of judicial concerns than that employed here (and
review of the literature), see RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 108-44 (1995).
16

The distance function utilized is for mathematical convenience, as we have no good
intuitions about the exact shape of this function (other than it is increasing as y moves away from
the player’s ideal point).
17

Quite obviously, the second consideration is only relevant for player H, since player
L cannot avoid having to decide on a given case.
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an existing (and potentially verifiable18) state of the world. From a practical
standpoint, the state of the world could represent any empirical determination that is
relevant to a subsequent policy choice by judges. Thus, borrowing from the example
above, the state of the world might embody scientific evidence about the marginal net
benefits of increasing the autonomy to market participants over the selection of safety
restraints in passenger vehicles. To simplify matters, we shall assume that the relevant
characteristics of the state of the world can
be represented by a one-dimensional
random variable X, whose realized value x
could be any point on the real line between
-4 and 4.19 Under the interpretation above,
then, x = -4 would denote extremely small
net benefits of autonomy, while x = 4
would denote the opposite. For analytical
simplicity, we shall (arbitrarily) assume that
both players begin with identical prior
FIGURE 1: PRIOR DENSITY OF THE “STATE OF
beliefs that X is distributed according to a
THE WORLD” (X)
Normal distribution, with mean 0 and
variance 1. Figure 1 at left depicts the classic bell-shaped structure of the standard
normal probability density. Note that the realized value of X is overwhelmingly likely
(in fact, more than ninety-five percent likely) to fall between x=-2 and x=2.20
Given the state of the world, each player’s ideal point is assumed to be
governed by a correspondence between a realized state of the world (i.e., x) and a
legal outcome (y). This correspondence, of course, might differ among the players
according to their “ideology.” In our motivating example, for instance, players who
place a relative high value on personal liberty would require a fairly strong evidentiary
showing to convince them that requiring safety restraints at the cost of constraining
individual autonomy is worthwhile. Other players who value safety, on the other

18

We say “potentially” because the verifiability of the state of the world depends on
the precision with which adjudicating players can measure it, a question taken up at greater length
below.
19

More formally, we assume that x 0 X /U.

20

In the Appendix, we present a more general framework in which the priors on X
are assumed normal with mean µ and variance 1/τ, so that the precision of the players’ prior beliefs
on X is simply τ. The qualitative results below are fully generalizable to that framework. In fact,
this framework even lends itself to the analysis of an “ignorant” prior: which corresponds to a
limiting distribution in which τ60. Although the prior distribution on X is not well defined for this
limiting case, the posterior distributions may well be. See MORRIS H. DEGROOT, OPTIMAL
STATISTICAL DECISIONS 190-98 (1970).
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hand, might require analogously strong evidence to convince them that the relative
dangers in constraining autonomy in this fashion are large. We attempt to capture the
intuition behind these interpretive differences by assuming that player H (whom we
shall treat as a
baseline player)
possesses an
L’s Ideal Point
Correspondence ( y = x + 1)
ideology that is
2
L
completely
“centrist.” That is,
H’s Ideal Point
if the state of the
Correspondence ( y = x )
y1 = 1
H
world were equal to
x, H’s ideal law
would simply set
y=x. In contrast,
we assume L’s ideal
-1
2
x
=
1
point is represented
by x+θ, where θ is
a
parameter
y0 = -1
reflecting L’s
ideology relative to
FIGURE 2: H’S AND L’S “IDEAL POINT” CORRESPONDENCES; (θ=1);
H. Note that if
θ>0, L’s ideal point is uniformly higher (more conservative) than H’s for every
possible state of the world. Such a situation is captured in Figure 2 at right, for the
special case of θ=1, indicating a situation in which L is more reticent than is H to
constrain individual autonomy through regulation. Note from the Figure that if the
state of the world were x=1, then player H’s ideal law would also be y=1, but that L’s
ideal point would be even higher (i.e., less regulatory) than H’s, at y=2. Conversely,
if θ<0, L’s ideal point is uniformly lower (more liberal) than H’s for every possible
realization of facts.

y

x

iii. Informational Environment:
The above details describe each player’s preference correspondence between
“facts” and “law,” but conditional upon knowing the true state of the world. Such
information, however, is generally not easy to come by, which (in our minds) provides
a principal normative justification for having a court “hear” a case—i.e., to receive
some more refined information about the existing state of the world. Within the
context of our model, then, the process of hearing a case is tantamount to receiving
a signal (albeit possibly an opaque one) about the true state of the world. The precise
characteristics of these signals are detailed below.
When L hears a case, she observes a signal, which we shall represent with a
random variable, Z. We shall suppose that L’s signal is not fully informative, in that
it consists of the true state of the world plus some additional “noise.” In particular,
L:\SPITZER\auditfin.wpd; 10 November 1998
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we posit that Z is drawn from a normal distribution with a mean precisely equal to the
true state of the world, x, and variance equal to 1/γ $ 0, so that the precision of L’s
signal is γ > 0.21 Note that implicit with this definition (though not critical) is an
assumption that L receives an unbiased signal of the facts. Of greater importance here
is the precision parameter γ, which represents a measure of L’s accuracy when
adjudicating the facts. If γ is close to zero, player L receives a somewhat
uninformative signal about the world. Conversely, as γ grows arbitrarily large, the
accuracy of L’s signal grows accordingly.
In contrast to L, player H’s decision comes in two stages: H must first decide
whether to review L’s decision, and then she must rule on the merits should she
decide to audit. In making the former decision, we assume that H may observe only
L’s final decision yL (making whatever inferences she can from L’s decision). Should
H decide to audit, however, she will be able to review the lower court’s evidentiary
record, thereby observing the realization of Z directly. Moreover, the process of
auditing gives H access to an additional signal, V, which is assumed to be normally
distributed independent of Z, with mean x and precision σ$0. The intuitive
interpretation of V is that it embodies additional information that is sometimes at the
disposal of a reviewing entity (in the form of the parties’ appellate briefs, amici briefs,
additional questioning, and the like). The parameter σ can be interpreted as H’s
marginal accuracy advantage over L. As σ gets close to zero, H’s decision is not
significantly better-informed than L’s (though, of course, political differences may
dictate a different ideal point for the same signal). However, as σ grows large, H’s
knowledge about the state of the world will be increasingly more informed than L’s.

"Nature" determines
the state of the world
by choosing x from
a standard-normal
distribution

L learns the realized
value of signal Z, and
renders a decision
yL e {-1, 1}

H decides whether to
audit L's holding

Grant

H learns the realized
value of signals Z and V,
and renders a decision
yH e {-1, 1}

Deny

L's holding y L stands

FIGURE 3: SEQUENCE OF MOVES FOR JUDICIAL AUDITING GAME

As noted above, H’s cost of auditing is assumed not to be known at the time
L renders her decision. This could be because either it is privately known by H, or
(more plausibly) because when L makes her decision, neither party knows the next
period’s workload of H, which directly affects H’s “opportunity cost” associated with

21

The “precision” of a normal distribution is defined to be the reciprocal of the
variance. DEGROOT, supra note 20, at 38.
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hearing this case22 The precise sequence of the interaction between L and H is
represented in the Figure 3.
b. Equilibrium Behavior.
With the framework of the model fully specified, we shall proceed to consider
the “equilibrium” behavior of the respective players. In order to avoid an overlytechnical and tedious analysis of this framework (which is beyond the scope of this
paper), we shall concentrate on a few questions of interest that have special relevance
for the topic of judicial independence. In particular, we are interested in the principal
determinants of both the auditing and reversal rate exhibited by H. For readers who
are somewhat uninterested in the equilibrium description, our primary insights are as
follows:
•

Player H will tend to audit L for one of two reasons: (1) “ideological”
differences between L and H (embodied by a value of θ that differs from
zero); and (2) imprecision of L relative to H (embodied by a small value of γ
combined with a large value of σ).

•

When imprecision dominates ideology as a reason for auditing, H will tend to
engage in a “two-sided” review strategy, in which the rates of auditing and
reversal are qualitatively similar regardless of whether L’s decision favors y0
or y1.

•

When ideology dominates imprecision as a reason for auditing, H will tend to
engage in a “one-sided” review strategy, in which H audits only those
decisions that are consistent with L’s ideological leanings, but not those that
are inconsistent with them.

•

Because a difference in ideology saves H from having to audit at least one
type of L’s decisions, in certain (though not all) circumstances, H may review
an ideological adversary’s opinions less often than those of an ideological
clone. An interesting consequence of this last observation is that an
ideologically diverse judiciary at the lower levels may play a beneficial role in
administering a judicial auditing system.

To best illustrate these arguments, we find it most convenient consider a number of
special cases of the framework described above. First, we will consider the case in
which the sole reason for auditing is to correct for L’s relative imprecision because

22

H’s workload decision is easily transformable into one of a constrained
optimization problem as in McNollgast, supra note 7.
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there are no ideological differences between H and L. Second, we will consider the
case in which the sole reason for auditing is to respond to ideological differences
because H has no informational advantage over L. Finally, we will compare a few
cases in which both imprecision and ideological differences provide H with rationale
for reviewing L.
Case 1: Auditing for “Pure Imprecision” (θ = 0; σ “large” relative to γ ).
Consider first the case in which H’s motivation to review L emanates solely
from superior information about the world, and not from ideological differences. In
terms of the parameters of the model above, this case corresponds to a situation
where θ = 0, but σ is large relative to γ .23 Suppose in particular that γ = ½, and σ=1.
In such an environment, what equilibrium strategies will the players exhibit?
Before answering this question numerically, it seems prudent first to at least
attempt to answer it intuitively, keeping in mind the respective player’s information
at the time that each acts. Recall that the signals received by L and H are informative
indications about the existing state of the world. Moreover, the parties’ signals are
positively correlated with the underlying state of the world, so that the larger the
respective player’s signal, the stronger the evidentiary case for favoring y1 over y0
(regardless of the player’s respective ideologies). Using this intuition, one would
guess that L would be more likely to support the new regulation (y1) when she
observes a relatively high signal (z), and conversely would tend to prefer the status
quo ante (y0) when she observes a low signal. The same can be said for H, at least in
those situations where H audits L’s opinion: only when the combined signals observed
by H (i.e., z and v) are sufficiently high will H will tend to favor the new regulation,
and not otherwise.
The equilibrium strategies of the parties in the “pure imprecision” case are
specified in Table 1 below. Note from the Table that L’s and H’s strategies
correspond well with the intuitions developed above. Indeed, L (the first mover) will
base her holding solely on the content of her signal, z. When z is negative, L will
favor the status quo; when z is positive, L will favor the new regulation. This seems
a sensible strategy; since L shares the same ideology as H, and she (like H) begins
with prior beliefs that give her no strong ex ante preference between the status quo
and the new regulation. After learning the value of z, however, L can make a more
refined deduction about whether the true state of the world (x) is closer to y0=-1 or
to y1=1, and will fashion her holding accordingly.

It is important to note that σ need not be larger than γ, only that it be positive.
Recall that since an auditing H is assumed to observe both L’s signal z and her own signal v, σ
measures H’s advantage in precision over and above L’s, and thus whenever σ>0, H has an
informational advantage over L.
23
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Player and Action

Equilibrium Strategy

L’s Holding (yL)

“Uphold” (yL = y1 = 1) whenever z $ 0
“Strike Down” (yL = y0 = -1) whenever z < 0

H’s Auditing Rate

Audit y1 (i.e., yL = 1) 18-percent of the time
Audit y0 (i.e., yL = -1) 18-percent of the time

H’s Holding (yH) if H
“Uphold” (yH = y1 = 1) whenever ½ z + v $ 0
Audits
“Strike Down” (yH = y0 = -1) whenever ½ z + v < 0
TABLE 1: EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES FOR PLAYERS H & L (PURE “IMPRECISION”).
In deciding whether to audit L’s opinion, H may take some solace from
knowing that L shares a common ideology, and thus employs a similar decisionmaking heuristic (albeit with more limited information).24 Consequently, H will tend
audit only if the expected value of the additional information is equal to or exceeds
the costs of auditing. Given L’s strategy, H is indifferent between auditing L and
abstaining when her realized cost of auditing is approximately $0.18. Thus, viewed
from the ex ante perspective, the probability that H audits either type of holding is 18
percent.25
Finally, should H decide to audit L, she will learn not only the content of L’s
signal (z) but also an independent signal (v) which adds greater precision to her
inference about the state of the world. Like L, H will base her decision on the content
of her information, but in this case will form a composite of the two available signals
in order to determine an outcome. Note that the composite signal is simply the sum
of the two signals H observes, weighted by their respective levels of precision. Thus,
H’s observation of v will receive twice the weight as her observation of z.
Consequently, the (unconditional) probability that H reverses L is also symmetric, and
equal to approximately 3.3 percent.
Before moving on, there are a few qualitative features of the “pure
imprecision” case that bear emphasis. First, note that when the dominant reason for
auditing is L’s imprecision (rather than ideology), player H will tend to adopt a two24

Importantly, if player H adopted an asymmetric auditing policy, the shared
ideologies among the players might actually provide L with a perverse incentive to choose the
holding that is most likely to be reviewed, no matter what his signal may be. The intuition behind
this behavior is that L cares only about the expected distance between the final legal outcome and
his ideal point, and H must privately bear the cost of collecting the additional signal about x. L may
therefore have an incentive to “free ride” off of H’s efforts, at least if L faces no embarrassment costs
associated with reversal.
25

That is, since the cost of auditing is uniformly distributed on [0,1], the ex ante
probability of H auditing is equal to the ex ante probability that her costs are below $0.18. This
numerical figure, and those to follow, are based on a numerical solution to the model specified here
and described in greater detail in the Appendix.
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sided auditing procedure, in which she is equally likely to review a decision to uphold
the new regulation as she is to review a decision striking it down. Moreover, not only
is the auditing rate symmetric, but it also is positively related to the informational
advantage that H has over L (embodied by σ). Thus, for example, if H’s advantage
were smaller than that depicted in the Table (such as σ=½), then the ex ante auditing
rate would fall to less than 5-percent, and the ex ante probability of reversal would
analogously fall to less than 1 percent. Conversely, if H’s advantage were
significantly larger (such as σ=2), then the auditing rate would increase to around 36percent, and the reversal rate would likewise increase to approximately 6.7 percent.
Case 2: Auditing for “Pure Ideology” (θ … 0; σ “small” relative to γ ).
Now consider the case in which H’s motivation to review L emanates solely
from a divergent ideology, and not from L’s relative imprecision. In terms of our
model, this case corresponds to a situation where θ … 0, and σ is relatively small
compared to γ . For the purposes of illustration, suppose in particular that θ = 1 (so
that L has a more deregulatory ideology than does H), γ = ½, and σ=0. In such an
environment, what equilibrium strategies will the players exhibit?
Once again, it seems prudent first to explore intuitively how the players would
respond to such an environment. Even though the parties’ respective ideologies
differ, it is still the case that both L and H would more likely tend to support the new
regulation (y1) when they each observe high signals, and would tend to prefer the
status quo ante (y0) when they observe low signals. The only difference in this case,
however, is that player L has a decidedly more autonomy-oriented ideology than does
H. As such, it would take a significantly stronger factual case against personal
autonomy to convince L that y0 is preferable to y1. Moreover, because L is a “harder
sell” on regulatory stances than is her counterpart H, one could easily imagine that
knowledge of these differences would likewise affect H’s auditing strategy, since H
would possibly perceive L’s holding as a biased distortion of the signal L observed.
The equilibrium strategies of the parties in the “pure ideology” case are
specified in Table 2 below. Once again, L’s and H’s strategies correspond well with
the intuitions developed above. Indeed, L will favor the (regulatory) status quo ante
only if the evidence from the case strongly supports regulation (z < -2.9). Otherwise,
L will tend to support the de-regulatory option.
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Player and Action

Equilibrium Strategy

L’s Holding (yL)

“Uphold” (yL = y1 = 1) whenever z $ -2.9
“Strike Down” (yL = y0 = -1) whenever z < -2.9

H’s Auditing Rate

Audit y1 (i.e., yL = 1) 65-percent of the time
Audit y0 (i.e., yL = -1) 0-percent of the time

H’s Holding (yH) if H
“Uphold” (yH = y1 = 1) whenever z $ 0
Audits
“Strike Down” (yH = y0 = -1) whenever z < 0
TABLE 2: EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES FOR PLAYERS H & L (PURE “IDEOLOGY”).
L’s ideological bent provides an interesting strategic tool for H in deciding
whether to audit L’s opinion. In particular, it allows H to pursue a “one-sided”
auditing strategy. She will never choose to audit a decision by L that favors the status
quo ante. H’s decision not to audit such a holding is perfectly sensible, and might
plausibly stem from the following reasoning:
“L’s holding tells me that she observed a signal that was sufficiently
convincing to overcome her own penchant for autonomy. Since I am much
more sympathetic to pro-regulatory policies, and since auditing will yield no
more information to me than that which L possessed when making her
decision, it is clear that I should not review this decision.”26

By the reverse reasoning, L’s relative ideology will make H even more suspicious
when L issues a holding that supports the new de-regulatory policy y1. Indeed, H will
be unsure whether L issued such a holding on account of a strong signal or because
L’s ideological proclivities caused him to interpret an otherwise weak signal in a
biased fashion. Consequently, then, a decision by L to uphold the new regulation will
be extremely susceptible to review by H: 65-percent likely, in this example.
Finally, when H decides to audit, she will base her opinion solely on the
content of the same signal that was observed by L, since in this case H is assumed to
have no informational advantage over L. Thus, when z<0, H will favor the status quo;
when z>0, H will favor the new regulation. All told, the expected rate of reversal for
this case is approximately 26-percent, a rate that tends to grow as the ideological
26

Similar results have been obtained in other models of judicial decision-making that
focus solely on ideological differences. See Cameron et al., supra note 4.
For the pop-culture cognoscenti, the reasoning described in the text is much akin to that of
the 1970s-era television commercials starring the extraordinarily finicky child named “Mikey,”
purported to hate everything. In each commercial, Mikey’s clever brothers exploited their younger
sibling’s discriminating tastes by using him to screen among new breakfast cereals, correctly
reasoning that “If Mikey likes it, we’ll all like it a fortiori.” (It is unlikely that Mikey’s siblings were
actually familiar with pretentious phrases like a fortiori; but the take-away message was nonetheless
the same).
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differences between H and L tend to widen.
Case 3: Auditing for “Mixed Motives” (θ … 0; σ “large” relative to γ ).
The previous two cases describe how either relative imprecision or relative
political bias can create incentives for H to audit’s L’s decisions. It is also possible
to explore what happens when both incentives exist. Doing so, however, does not
substantially affect the intuitions illustrated above. In particular, when both
imprecision and ideology exist, H’s auditing decision will tend to respond to the most
dominant effect. Thus, for example, if one slightly alters Case 1, so that γ = ½, and
σ=1, but θ takes on a positive but relatively small value such as 0.05, the equilibrium
strategies change slightly (but not dramatically) in the direction of one-sided auditing.
Rather than employing symmetric auditing at a frequency of 18 percent, H will now
audit a y0 holding 13 percent of the time, but will audit a y1 at a 23 percent rate. This
behavior still constitutes two-sided auditing, but it is becoming increasingly
asymmetric and moving in the direction of the exclusive one-sided auditing strategy
discussed in Case 2.
Perhaps of greater interest is the question of how ideological differences affect
auditing and reversal rates. Although one’s intuition is that cæteris paribus, greater
ideological differences should be reflected in greater rates of review and reversal, this
need not always be the case. For example, Table 3 below compares (A) “pure
imprecision” as per Case 1; (B) a small variation of Case 1in which L has slightly antiregulatory proclivity of θ=.25; and (C) a different version of the pure-imprecision case
in which the precision of L’s signal is γ = 0.2.
Pure Imprecision (A)
(θ = 0, γ = .5, σ=1)

Mixed Motive (B)
(θ = 0.25, γ =.5, σ=1)

Pure Imprecision (C)
(θ = 0, γ = .2, σ=1)

Exp. Audit
Rate

18 %

15 %

23%

Exp. Rev.
Rate

3.3 %

4.8%

5.1%

TABLE 3: A COMPARISON OF EXPECTED AUDIT AND REVERSAL RATES
Consider first the comparison of columns (A) and (B), which differ only the
ideology parameter θ (with L having a slight deregulatory bias in column (B)).
Although the reversal rate is as one’s intuition might suggest, the expected audit rate
for column (B) is in fact lower than that of column (A), even with relative precision
levels held constant. This lower rate of review reflects a potential benefit of a onesided auditing regime, in which H need audit only one type of decision by L. In order
to implement such a regime, however, it is necessary for L to have an ideology that
is distinct from H’s. To the extent that H’s workload makes it difficult for her to
L:\SPITZER\auditfin.wpd; 10 November 1998
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audit all cases, the comparison of columns (A) and (B) suggests that political
differences between L and H may serve to economize on the frequency of audits.
Moreover, as a comparison of columns (B) and (C) illustrates, H may both audit and
reverse a relatively accurate (though politically distinct) L less often than she would
one whose ideological bent was closer to H’s, but who was relatively inaccurate.
Once again, this comparison suggests that there are some plausible situations in which
some “diversity” in the political ideology of lower-echelon actors may be beneficial
to those further up in the decision-making hierarchy.
Moreover, these observations suggest that attempts to measure empirically the
role of ideology within the judiciary should exercise caution in interpreting the
relationship between politics and judicial review. As noted above, it is tempting to
think that observed review and reversal rates are a reliable proxy for ideological
differences between lower- and upper-echelon judicial actors.27 As this discussion
demonstrates, however, empirical auditing and reversal rates need not bear a
systematic relationship to political differences when there is variable precision within
lower courts.28
III. APPLICATIONS
The example from the previous section suggests some interesting predictions
about auditing behavior among upper-echelon judicial actors. Most notably, it
predicts an auditing strategy that can be either even-handed or asymmetric, depending
on whether the dominant reason for reviewing is (respectively) imprecision or
ideology. In this section, we use these intuitions to provide an interpretation of
judicial behavior within a number of specific cases, and we posit its relevance for
more general theories of adjudication.
a. One-Sided Review in Legal Doctrine
i. Review of Administrative Decisions
The issue of whether courts should apply one-sided or two-sided review of
lower level decision makers sometimes bursts into doctrinal prominence. Consider,
for example, the following debate from administrative law. When an administrative
agency promulgates a regulation that is admittedly within the agency’s delegation, the
parties subject to the regulation sometimes challenge the regulation as being “arbitrary
or capricious.”29 The federal courts must then evaluate the regulation. At other times

27

See, e.g., Cross & Tiller, supra note 7.

28

This discussion is taken up again infra in Part III(b).

29

5 U.S.C. § 706.

L:\SPITZER\auditfin.wpd; 10 November 1998

16

SPITZER & TALLEY: Judicial Auditing

agencies take deregulatory actions by, for example, rescinding previously adopted
regulations. Deregulatory actions can also be challenged as being “arbitrary or
capricious.” The issue, then, is whether courts should apply a more demanding, less
demanding, or equally demanding standard when evaluating deregulatory actions by
administrative agencies, as compared to the standard applied to regulatory actions by
the same agencies.
The Supreme Court directly faced this issue in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’
Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.30 In State Farm,
the Court was evaluating the Reagan era National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration’s decision to rescind a motor vehicle safety standard that had required
that all automobiles produced after 1982 be equipped with “passive restraints,” such
as automatic seatbelts or airbags.
Because NHTSA’s action was deregulatory, the Court had to consider the
parties’ contentions that the appropriate standard of review was different from that
for regulatory action. In an opinion by Abner Mikva (a Democrat often perceived as
a political liberal), the Court of Appeals – after an extensive examination of the
legislative history of the acts involved (and considerable hand wringing)31 – finally
concluded that it must review the rescission of a safety standard more closely than a
promulgation of a safety standard. Put differently, the Court of Appeals showed less
deference to the deregulatory action than it would to a regulatory action. In complete
contrast, the NHTSA argued that rescission of a safety standard deserved less intense
review (and hence more deference) from the reviewing court than the promulgation
of a safety standard. Both the Court of Appeals’ and NHTSA’s suggested standards
are one-sided review strategies. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by the moderate
Justice White, rejected both suggestions and chose a two-sided review strategy. In
other words, under the Court’s opinion, the same standard should apply evenhandedly to both regulatory and deregulatory actions:
Unlike the Court of Appeals, we do not find the appropriate scope of judicial
review to be the “most troublesome question” in these cases. . . . The
agency's action in promulgating such standards therefore may be set aside if
found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law." . . . We believe that the rescission or modification
of an occupant-protection standard is subject to the same test.
Petitioner Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA)
disagrees, contending that the rescission of an agency rule should be judged
by the same standard a court would use to judge an agency's refusal to
promulgate a rule in the first place -- a standard petitioner believes
considerably narrower than the traditional arbitrary-and-capricious test. We
reject this view. . . . Petitioner's view would render meaningless Congress'

30

463 U.S. 29 (1983).

31

680 F.2d 206, 222, 228 (1982).
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authorization for judicial review of orders revoking safety rules. Moreover,
the revocation of an extant regulation is substantially different than a failure
to act. Revocation constitutes a reversal of the agency's former views as to
the proper course. Accordingly, an agency changing its course by rescinding
a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that
which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance. . .
. But the forces of change do not always or necessarily point in the direction
of deregulation. In the abstract, there is no more reason to presume that
changing circumstances require the rescission of prior action, instead of a
revision in or even the extension of current regulation. If Congress
established a presumption from which judicial review should start, that
presumption -- contrary to petitioners' views -- is not against safety
regulation, but against changes in current policy that are not justified by the
rulemaking record. While the removal of a regulation may not entail the
monetary expenditures and other costs of enacting a new standard, and,
accordingly, it may be easier for an agency to justify a deregulatory action,
the direction in which an agency chooses to move does not alter the standard
of judicial review established by law.32

The intuitions from the strategic analysis in the previous section animate an
interesting interpretation of this judicial debate over standards of review. Indeed, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (and most other executive branch
administrative agencies under the Reagan administration) were extremely
conservative. Judge Mikva, writing for the Court of Appeal, had been a liberal
Democratic member of Congress before being appointed to the DC Circuit. At the
same time, the NHTSA likely possessed considerable expertise in observing and
interpreting automobile safety data. Under such an arrangement – where ideological
differences dominate concerns over imprecision – we would expect one-sided
auditing, in which Judge Mikva would be inclined to engage in a rigorous review only
of deregulatory actions, but not regulatory ones.33 The Supreme Court, by
comparison to Judge Mikva, was much more conservative. As a consequence, the
Supreme Court’s politics were fairly closely aligned with those of NHTSA. This is
precisely where our model suggests that two-sided auditing is more likely.

32

463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).

33

To be precise, our model requires knowledge of both the precision of the lower
level, as well as the relative politics of the lower level and the appellate level. One could argue that
the NHTSA, by virtue of expertise, is likely to be precise in its technical predictions. If this is so,
the model’s predictions are clearly as described in the paragraph above. If not, the best we can say
is that the doctrinal choices of the Courts of Appeal and of the Supreme Court are consistent with
our model.
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ii. Equal Protection Doctrine
The tension over one-sided or two-sided auditing has also surfaced in the law
of equal protection. All members of the Supreme Court appear to agree that racial
classifications in laws that harm or disadvantage minority group members can only
be constitutional if the laws pass muster under a “strict scrutiny” analysis. In Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,34 the Supreme Court
faced the issue of whether “benign” racial classifications should also garner strict
scrutiny, or some less demanding form of review. In Metro, the Federal
Communications Commission, with some strong prompting from Congress, had
adopted several programs that gave preferences to racial minorities35 when the FCC
was awarding broadcasting licenses.36 These policies were considered benign because
their purpose, and probably their effect,37 was to aid minority group members.
The majority, consisting of Brennan, Marshall, White, Blackmun, and Stevens,
held that the FCC’s policies could be justified by an “important” governmental
interest:
Congress and the FCC have selected the minority ownership policies
primarily to promote programming diversity, and they urge that such
diversity is an important governmental objective that can serve as a
constitutional basis for the preference policies. We agree.38

The majority also concluded that the challenged policies needed to be “substantially

34

497 U.S. 547 (1990).

35

There were, to a much lesser extent, programs for women.

36

There were four such programs. First, when the FCC awarded most broadcasting
stations it used a “comparative hearing,” in which all applicants were compared to one another.
Minority applicants were given extra credit in the comparative hearing. Second, sometimes the FCC
used a lottery to award broadcasting stations. Minority applicants got extra chances. Third, if a
broadcaster sold its license to a minority purchaser, the seller would get a “tax certificate,” which
allowed the seller to defer payment of tax on the gain from the sale. Fourth, sometimes broadcasters
do things that arguably violate the FCC’s rules, and find themselves scheduled for a hearing before
the FCC on the alleged violations. If, before the hearing, the licensee sold the license to a minority
purchaser for no more than 75% of fair market value, the purchaser would take free of any violations
committed by the seller. 497 U.S. at 557. See generally Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying Minority
Preferences in Broadcasting, 64 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 293, 297-302 (1991).
37

See Jeff Dubin and Matthew L. Spitzer, Testing Minority Preferences in
Broadcasting, 68 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 841 (1995).
38

497 U.S. at 566.
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related” to achieving the important governmental interest.39
The dissent, consisting of O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy, would
have applied strict scrutiny even-handedly to both benign and harmful racial
classifications. Explicitly, the dissent would have required a “compelling” state
interest, and the challenged laws would have had to have been “narrowly tailored” to
achieve the compelling state interest.
To uphold the challenged programs, the Court departs from these
fundamental principles and from our traditional requirement that racial
classifications are permissible only if necessary and narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling interest. This departure marks a renewed toleration of
racial classifications and a repudiation of our recent affirmation that the
Constitution's equal protection guarantees extend equally to all citizens.40

The Metro majority was comprised of the five most liberal members of the
court. Four of these members, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun, were
clearly to the left of both the lower federal courts and the center of gravity of the U.S.
political scene during the Reagan/Bush era. Under these circumstances our model
predicts that one might expect these four Supreme Court Justices to favor one-sided
auditing. Liberal choices--benign racial classifications--need garner only limited
review. Conservative choices--harmful racial classifications--would require much
more intense scrutiny.
The four members in the dissent, O’Connor, Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Scalia,
were quite conservative, and hence were much more in line with the legislative and
administrative bodies that were likely to be creating laws with racial classifications.
In such circumstances, our model predicts that it is likely41 that the conservative
justices will prefer two-sided monitoring. Applying strict scrutiny to both benign and
harmful racial classifications can be understood as a type of two-sided monitoring.
Justice White, in contrast, is a bit of a puzzle. In a previous case, Richmond
v. J. A. Croson Co.,42 Justice White had apparently opted for two-sided monitoring,
voting with a majority that applied strict scrutiny to all racial classifications. In
Metro, however, Justice White appeared to have a change of heart and voted (along
with the four dissenters from Croson) in favor of one-sided monitoring. Because
Justice White was politically centrist, our model is least able to make predictions
about his choice. His change of heart could have been because of changes in the
political environment, or might have been because his own politics drifted to the left.

39

497 U.S. at 569.

40

497 U.S. at 602.

41

Assuming the appropriate levels of precision are met, that is.

42

488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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However, just five years later Justice Thomas had replaced Justice White and,
in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,43 the Court reversed its position. Adarand
involved minority preferences in contracting with the government and raised the same
issue of benign racial classifications that the Court had decided (differently) in Croson
and Metro. Justice O’Connor wrote for a majority that included (with minor
disagreements, here and there) Rehnquist, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. The four
dissenters were Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter.
The obvious
conservative/liberal split produces exactly the same result (on a Justice by Justice
basis) that it produced in Croson and Metro.
Does our model help to predict the same conservative/liberal split in 1995?
By 1995, the federal government was controlled by conservative Republicans in the
House and Senate, and a middle-of-the-road Democratic President. This probably
produces legislation similar to that of a federal government comprised of a
conservative Republican President and a Senate and House controlled by a middle-ofthe-road Democratic Party.44
State governments are a trickier issue. In 1990 four state governments were
unified Republican,45 29 were split, and 16 were unified Democratic. By 1995, 12
state governments were unified Republican, 29 were split, and eight were unified
Democratic.46 The median state government remained split, and indeed most state
governments were under split control. Thus, one could argue that the political center
of gravity in state governments had not changed substantially from 1990 to 1995.
However, there was likely at least some rightward movement in state governments,
since eight state governments moved from the “unified Democratic” to the “unified
Republican” category. The expected product from a randomly-chosen state would
therefore be somewhat more conservative.47 Consequently, our model can make no
firm prediction that all judicial attitudes towards auditing would not change, vis a vis
state legislation, between 1990 and 1995. We can say, however, that the liberal
justices, all of whom favored one-sided auditing in 1990, should continue to favor
43

515 U.S. 200 (1995).

44

We are aware that the different roles played by the House and Senate--jointly
proposing legislation--and the President--accepting or rejecting proposed legislation--will produce
some difference. However, all three branches must accept changes from the status quo. Congress
was “veto-proof” in neither 1990 nor 1995. Hence, differences in legislation produced was probably
small enough to allow our textual analysis to stand.
45

“Unified Republican control” is defined as the governor and both upper and lower
houses in control of Republicans. “Unified Democratic control” is defined as the governor and both
the upper and lower houses in control of Democrats. “Split” government is anything else. Nebraska
is omitted.
46

Calculations on file with author.

47

We presume the Supreme Court must choose one rule for all states.
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one-sided auditing in 1995. Extremely conservative justices who preferred two-sided
auditing in 1990 should continue to favor two-sided auditing in 1995. Moderately
conservative justices who preferred two-sided auditing in 1990 could conceivably
have been moved to prefer two-sided auditing in 1995 by a mild rightward shift in
state politics. These justices might or might not have changed their attitudes.48
We can therefore conclude that the voting on doctrines in Adarand was
entirely consistent with the predictions our model can make. However, our model
cannot make predictions as to every justice regarding the review of state laws.
b. Empirical Predictions Based on Competence
One may be able to use judicial competence -- called precision in our model -to predict differences in reversal rates; less precise courts should be reversed more
often. This result, while not surprising in and of itself, should be exacerbated by the
monitoring behavior of the higher court. As the lower court’s (or level’s) precision
falls, the higher court will move to two-sided auditing.
Ideally, from an empirical standpoint, one would like to be able to observe
directly two-sided auditing or one-sided auditing, on a case-by-case basis, without the
aid of a change in doctrine. If we could do so, and if we could come up with a proxy
for precision, then we could directly test the prediction. We would, perhaps, regress
reversal rates on lower court precision, while controlling for politics and other
relevant independent variables. Unfortunately, such an approach is probably
unavailable. Indeed, since “auditing” in our model stands for taking a genuine
reexamination of the record rather than a cursory wave of the hand, it may be difficult
to discern, from the outside, whether the higher court has really “audited” a decision.
As a consequence, it will be difficult to observe whether a court engages in one-sided
or two-sided auditing. This will make it difficult to test directly the prediction about
auditing and precision.
We can, however, posit another prediction with a somewhat more
psychological basis, if one believes that perceptions about judicial competence are
inversely related to the empirical rate of reversal. Indeed, as more cases are audited,
more should be reversed. More to the point, holding political differences constant,
greater imprecision among lower courts will lead to both more two-sided auditing by
higher courts, and to higher reversal rates among audited cases. Consequently, those
lower court judges with reputations for lack of precision should face higher empirical
reversal rates, in part because higher courts move to two-sided auditing in response
to the reputation.
Further, if the higher reversal rates help reinforce reputation, the lower court
judge’s reputation might well be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, if a judge starts with
a reputation for being precise, one-sided auditing could produce a low enough
48

Again, we presume the right degrees of precision to make the political analysis

work.
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reversal rate to sustain this reputation. Another judge, starting with a reputation for
being imprecise, could, because of two-sided auditing, get a high enough reversal rate
to sustain the reputation. The two judges could, in actuality, be equally precise.
Now, can we find a good proxy for precision? Who would start with a
reputation for being precise, and who would start with a reputation for being
imprecise? We can suggest two possibilities. First, in his book on the federal courts,
Richard Posner suggests that there are different categories of appointments.49 Some
are purely political payoffs. These judges might be regarded as relatively imprecise.
Others are quality appointments. These judges might be regarded as more precise.
They might get “tracked” into one sided or two sided auditing from the start. We
would predict higher reversal rates, on average, for “political” appointees to the
bench, holding politics constant.
Second, we might be able to utilize ABA ratings of appointees to the bench.
The ABA rates nominees as “highly qualified,” “qualified,” or “unqualified.” If these
ratings can serve as proxies for decreasing levels of precision, we can fashion a second
empirical prediction. We would predict higher reversal rates, on average, for
nominees rated “qualified” than for those nominees rated “highly qualified,” holding
politics constant.
c. Deciding Like Cases Alike
One of the basic principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence is that like cases
should be decided alike. Legal analysts as diverse as Lon Fuller,50 H. L. A. Hart,51
and John Rawls52 regard this principle as central to a system of law. Law professors
teach law students to compare cases and evaluate them for consistency.53 A court
system that fails to treat like cases alike, runs traditional analysis, should suffer from
a harsh critique.
Our analysis suggests that outside observers, such as lawyers, law professors,
journalists, and ordinary citizens may perceive a lot of failure to treat like cases alike.
Our model predicts that a Court of Appeals judge will adjust her review strategy
according to her assessment of the lower court’s accuracy and ideology. This can
confound the outsider’s interpretation of the judicial process if the observer is not

49

RICHARD POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE & REFORM 13-20 (1996).

50

LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (Revised Ed. 1964) (claiming that
the failure to achieve consistency precludes the existence of law).
51

H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155 (1961).

52

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 237 (1971).

53

STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 25-47

(2nd Ed. 1995).
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fully aware of the underlying dynamics of the system.
To see how this might work, consider Figure 4. Figure 4 depicts a court
system with two separate circuits, much like a stylized version of our federal court
system. Circuit 1 has a lower court, LC1, which has liberal ideology, and a Court of
Appeals, AC1, which is conservative. (The various courts’ ideal points are noted with
arrows on the diagram54). Circuit 2 has a lower court, LC2, which has conservative
ideology and a precision identical to that of LC1, and a Court of Appeals, AC2, which
has a conservative ideology identical to AC1. The status quo ante is very liberal, and
identical cases come up simultaneously before LC1 and LC2. The two lower courts
choose the identical conservative outcome, denoted “New Reg” in Figure 4. This is
because both LC1 and LC2 happen to draw a very conservative signal, called “z” in
Figure 4. The extremely conservative signal leads even the liberal lower court, LC1,
New
NewReg.
Reg.

Status
StatusQuo
Quo

Liberal

Signal
v
(AC)

LC1

Signal
z
AC1
(LC) LC &
True
2
AC2
x

Conservative

FIGURE 4: LIKE CASES NEED NOT BE TREATED ALIKE

to choose the conservative New Reg.
The Appellate Court in Circuit 1, AC1, may well have adopted one-sided
auditing for LC1. When the liberal LC1 issues a conservative decision, the AC1 may
not bother to audit the decision, in essence affirming it without even looking. The
Appellate Court will reason that if a lower court with liberal tendencies chose a
conservative outcome, the lower court must have observed a very conservative signal.
Hence, AC1 can save its resources and affirm the conservative outcome without an
independent look at things.
LC2, however, may well come in for two-sided auditing from AC2 in Circuit
2. When the Appellate Court in Circuit 2 reviews the case from LC2, its review of the
record may (at least sometimes) convince the Appellate Court to reverse the lower
court’s decision. For example, in Figure 4 we show what happens if AC2 reviews LC2
and gets a liberal signal, called “v” in Figure 4. The Appellate Court, which was able
to conclude very little about the signal received by the conservative LC2's signal from

54

Recall, however, that the courts may not know their actual ideal points when they
make a decision, because such points are contingent on having perfect information about x.
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the choice of the conservative outcome New Reg,55 will revise its beliefs when it sees
the liberal signal v. If v is liberal enough, as in Figure 4, AC2 will reverse LC2 and
reinstate the status quo ante.
An observer, such as a law professor or a newspaper reporter, who is
reviewing the cases, will likely read both records--in essence auditing both of them.
If the professor or reporter does not understand the dynamics underlying the two
decisions, he or she will tend to embrace the following standard critique, based upon
the rule of law. In particular, the observer will likely critique the Courts of Appeals
in the two Circuits by calling the cases “inconsistent” and conclude that the cases
violate the rule of law. The decisions will not even be reconcilable on standard
political grounds--that conservative judges like to approve only conservative results.
Here both decisions were conservative. The observer, casting around for some way
to reconcile the two decisions, may fasten onto the politics of the lower court justices.
But even here the observer may be frustrated; the two conservative Courts of Appeals
appear to be punishing the conservative judge and rewarding the liberal one.
But our analysis suggests that the normative critique may not be right. It is
possible that appellate courts are right to utilize all the information at their disposal,
including the political preferences of lower courts and the lower courts’ precision, to
formulate a review strategy. For this to be true we would need to believe not only
that politics are part of law, but that we should openly embrace (or at least tolerate)
it. We would also need openly to acknowledge that not all lower court judges are of
equal ability, and that some deserve less “independence” than others.56 Resolving
these issues lies well beyond the scope of our paper; but it is, however, worth noticing
that there may be a severe conflict between appellate courts’ optimal auditing
strategies and the appearance of legitimacy in the pattern of decisions that are
approved and reversed.
d. Independence and Accountability.
Finally, if one applies our framework to inter- rather than intra-branch
conflict, it may be possible to glean some modest insights into the current debate over
judicial “independence” versus “accountability.” While the U.S. Constitution
mandates formal institutional separation between the federal judiciary and other
branches of government, the precise nature of that separation has proven to be
somewhat elusive. Indeed, though nominally independent, the federal judiciary is
frequently hamstrung by a number formal constraints on its independence, and must

55

Assume that the appellate courts are not aware of the decisions of trial courts in

other circuits.
56

Even if these propositions about politics and accuracy are true, openly
acknowledging them to be true is a controversial act. See Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 296 (1990).
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yield to other branches as to such matters as the creation and regulation of new
courts, the appointment or impeachment of judges, judicial salary increases, and even
the prospective (and sometimes retrospective) modification of judicial decisions.57 It
is in this sense that the judiciary has been described as simultaneously independent of
and accountable to other branches of government. Although talented members of the
bench, bar, and legal academy have wrestled with the enterprise of refining and
clarifying these institutional contours, the tension between independence and
accountability remains palpable and largely unresolved.58
To be sure, tensions such as these may simply be part and parcel of a healthy
constitutional democracy, and therefore inevitable.59 At the same time, however, such
mirthful concessions do little to resolve the ongoing debate about the existence and
magnitude of purported “threats” to judicial independence. Our analysis suggests that
those interested in this debate may find it fruitful to decompose the possible rationales
for external audits of the judiciary, and only then juxtapose the most likely of these
to a normative account of judicial independence. Suppose, for instance, that one
believed the principal normative justification of judicial independence is to provide a
prophylactic against the dangers of cyclical factional politics—the so-called
“countermajoritarian difficulty.”60 Under such an account, external audits of the
judiciary borne of ideological differences might constitute a bona-fide threat, while
auditing for imprecision would be substantially less objectionable. Although
distinguishing between these two rationales is not always easy in practice,61 our
arguments suggest that empirical evidence of one-sided versus two-sided auditing may
be a helpful diagnostic proxy. Thus, if judges were to receive external criticism from
only one segment of the political spectrum, or if the judicial opinions that received
substantial criticism were only those that paddled against the prevailing political
current, then one might have a strong case for inferring an institutional threat to the
judiciary. On the other hand, if external criticism were substantially bipartisan, more
even handed across judicial opinions, or relatively procedural (rather than

57

See note 1, supra.

58

See, e.g., ABA REPORT, supra note 2, at 45 (1997) (noting the tension over interbranch conflict, that it is both “intractable” and “inevitable,” and offering little in the way of
resolution other than a vague notion of “mutual respect”).
59

Id. at 45.

60

See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 17-21 (2d ed.
1988); THE FEDERALIST, No. 10 (Madison).
61

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Madison) (rejecting “inability” as a criterion
for impeachment, apparently for fear that it would be susceptible to political opportunism and abuse).
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substantive),62 inter-branch conflict may not only be less troubling, but also
normatively appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a simple framework for analyzing a hierarchical
system of judicial auditing. We have concentrated on (what we perceive to be) the
two most central reasons that courts and/or legislatures tend to scrutinize the
decisions of lower-echelon actors: imprecision and ideological bias. In comparing
these two reasons, we have illustrated how each may yield systematically distinct
auditing and reversal behaviors. While auditing for imprecision tends to bring about
even-handed auditing/reversal, auditing for political bias tends to be significantly more
one-sided. Examples of these tendencies can be found in a number of legal
applications, including administrative law, constitutional law, and interpretive theories
of jurisprudence. Moreover, these tendencies may provide a helpful informational
proxy by which to evaluate the existence and magnitude of purported threats to
judicial independence. Finally, our analysis suggests that political “diversity” among
initial decision-makers (in addition to its other laudable goals) may be an important
and generally underappreciated means for economizing on judicial administrative costs
and easing the workload burdens on upper-echelon actors.

62

For example, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Administrative
Oversight and the Courts, has recently circulated questionnaires to federal judges inquiring about
judicial use of decision-making resources, support staff, and extra-judicial activities. ABA REPORT,
supra note 2, at 31.
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V. APPENDIX
This Appendix explores a more general framework of analysis, from which the
numerical results in the text were drawn. Recall that the model described in Section
II contained the following variables:
L=

Lower court (or administrative agency, or unified judiciary);

H=

Higher court (or court reviewing agency, or unified legislature);

y0 =

Status quo ante;

y1 =

New regulation; assume (without loss of generality) that y0 < y1.

X=

Random variable describing the “true” state of the world. Realizations of
this variable are denoted by x, and we assume X ~ N(µ, 1/τ).

Z=

Random variable describing the signal received by L, assumed normally
distributed around the true state with precision γ; Z ~ N(x,1/γ).

V=

Random variable describing the additional signal received by H, assumed
normally distributed around the true state with precision γ; Z ~ N(x,1/γ).

c=

H’s costs of auditing, where c 0 C / [0,4); c ~ g(c)>0, with associated
distribution function G(c). The value of c is realized and observed only
after L issues its opinion (and the rigor of H’s docket becomes known).

For notational ease, let Ai 0{Deny, Grant} represent H’s auditing strategy of player
H given a holding of yH =yi by L.
The solution concept we use for solving this game is Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. We shall conjecture one solution (though there may be others) that
corresponds with a “trigger strategy” profile for both L and H, as follows:
L:

yL = y1 if and only if z$ z*;

H:

A0 = Grant if and only if c# c0*;
A1 = Grant if and only if c# c1*;
yH = y1 if and only if v$ v* (so long as H’s signal is informative)
yH = y1 if and only if z$ z** (if H’s signal is uninformative)

To confirm that this indeed is an equilibrium, we proceed through standard
backward induction techniques. First, we consider the optimal actions of H assuming
the auditing decision has been made. Second, we move backwards to consider H’s
penultimate decision about whether to audit L’s decision. Finally, we consider L’s
L:\SPITZER\auditfin.wpd; 10 November 1998

28

SPITZER & TALLEY: Judicial Auditing

opinion in the initial case.
A. H’s strategy conditional on auditing yL:
Suppose first that L has issued a judgment and that H has decided to audit this
judgment. This is the last possible stage of the game, in which H need not consider
the costs of auditing (which are now sunk), and can concentrate solely on choosing
between y0 and y1 so as to maximize expected utility conditional on the realizations
of signals z and v. For clarity of exposition, we shall assume in what follows that if
a court is indifferent about the two potential outcomes, it will break the tie by
upholding the new regulation.63 An equivalent statement of H’s problem, then, is as
follows:
Miny 0{y

0 , y1 }

E {( y & X)2 | z, v}.

(1)

Analysis of this expression yields the following lemma:
Lemma 1:

If H audits L’s decision, it will favor y1 over y0 if and only if :
Jµ % (z %F v
J % (% F

$

y0 % y1
2

Proof: Equation (1) implies that y1 yields a (weakly) greater payoff for H than does
y0 if and only if:
E{ (y1 - X)2 | v, z } # E{ (y0 - X)2 | v, z },

which—after expansion—simplifies to:
E{X | v, z } $

y0 %y1
2

(3)

Now recall that the players’ prior beliefs are that X ~ N(µ, 1/τ). Since Z|X ~ N(x,1/γ)
and V|X ~ N(x,1/σ), applying Bayes’ rule one finds that the posterior distribution of
X conditional on the realizations of Z and V is N( (τµ+γz+σv)/(τ+γ+σ), 1/(τ+γ+σ) ).64
Substituting the mean of this conditional distribution for the left hand side of (3) yields

63

This assumption is easily relaxed without loss of generality.

64

See DeGroot supra note 7, Chapter 10.
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the expression given in the Lemma. QED.
Assuming for the moment that σ>0, then Lemma 1 implies that H favors
yH=y1 if and only if:
v $ v ((z) /

y0 %y1
2F

@ J %( %F &

J µ % (z
F

(4)

Conversely, if σ=0, then will hold yH=y1 if and only if:
z $ z (( /

y0%y1
2

@

J
%1
(

&

Jµ
(

(5)

This establishes the first portion of our conjectured equilibrium: i.e., conditional on
auditing, H will hold yH = y1 whenever v $ v* and signal V is informative, but yH = y1
whenever z$ z** and signal V is uninformative.
B. The decision to Audit
Consider now the analysis of H’s auditing decision. Recall that when H must
choose whether to audit L’s holding, it is privy to very little information. In fact, all
that H knows is the outcome favored by L. But because L can favor either of the two
outcomes, it is necessary to consider H’s strategy for both a lower court holding
striking down the new regulation (y0) and one that upholds it (y1). One must consider
these cases one at a time.
i. Auditing a holding for the status quo.
Suppose first that L has struck down the new regulation (so that yL = y0 ).
Under the assumption that L has followed the trigger-point equilibrium strategy
conjectured above, H will attempt to assess the expected net gains from auditing. In
particular, H will audit only if her expected utility from doing so exceeds that of
abstaining. Equivalently, H will audit if and only if:
E x{(y0&X)2 | z#z (} $ c % Ev,z{ E x{(y H &X)2 | v, z} | z#z (}

(6)

The intuition behind this expression is simple. If H abstains, it will receive its
expected payoff from y0 denoted on the left-hand side of (6) knowing only that z#z*.
If H audits yL = y0, on the other hand, it will learn both v and z, but it will bear the cost
of c. to do so. Viewed at the time of the auditing decision, however H must take
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expectations over the auditing payoff knowing only that z#z*. Rearranging (6) yields
the result that H will audit y0 if and only if:
(

c # c0 (z () / E x{ (y0&X)2 | z#z (}& Ev,z{ E x{(y H & X)2 |v, z} |z#z (}

(7)

Thus, H will audit a holding of y0 if and only if c# c0*(z*), which corresponds to the
hypothesized trigger point equilibrium strategy. Moreover, the ex ante probability
that H audits a holding of y0 is equal to G(c0*(z*)), which we can denote G0* for short.
ii. Auditing a holding for the new regulation:
A symmetric analysis applies to the case of auditing a holding of y1 by L.
Consequently, H will audit a holding of y1 if and only if:
(

c # c1 (z () / E x{(y1&X)2 | z$z (}& Ev,z{ E x{(y H &X)2 | v, z} | z$z (} ,

(8)

which corresponds to the hypothesized trigger point equilibrium strategy. The ex ante
probability that H audits a holding of y1 is equal to G(c1*(z*)), which we can denote
G1* for short.
C. The decision by L
Finally, assume that L knows H will audit after a holding of yi with probability
Gi*. Thus, conditional on learning z, player L will hold y1 if and only if:
(

(

(1&G0 )@E x{(y0&2& X)2 | z} $ (1&G1 )@E x{(y1&2 &X)2 |z }
(

(

% (G1 &G0 )@ E v{ E x{(y H&X &2)2 |z, v } |z }

(9)

which expands to:
(

(1&G0 )@

1
J%(

% y0 & 2&

Jµ%(z
J%(

2

(

1
J%(
(
(
(G1 &G0 )@

$ (1&G1 )@
%

Jµ%(z
J%(
H

% y1 & 2&

2

(10)

E v{ E x{(y &X &2)2 | z, v }| z }

In all cases where H follows a symmetric auditing strategy, (so that G0* = G1*), the
conclusion is immediate that L will hold for y1 if and only if:
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z $ z( /

y0%y1
2

&2 @

J
%1
(

&

Jµ
(

(11)

When H follows an asymmetric auditing strategy, the analysis is more complex, and
the existence of a trigger-point equilibrium as hypothesized may depend on the values
of the parameters considered. For the example in the text, however, such an
equilibrium exists and is presented.
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